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IN RE: This Issue, Gruber's Schwartz's

review of  
Judaism and Vegetarianism 
Judaism and Veget<;rrianlsm is a 
polemic that argues that based on 
Jewish values, people should be vege­
tarians. Its message can be summed 
up by the question with which I end 
the book: 
In view of the. strong Jewish 
mandates to be compassionate 
to animals, preserve health, 
help feed the hungry, pre­
serve and protect the environ­
ment, and seek and pursue 
peace and the very negative 
effects flesh-centered diets 
have in each of these areas, 
how do you justify not becom­
ing a vegetarian? 
While he states that he is a vege­
tarian, Rabbi Marc Alan Gruber 
apparently is determined to convince 
people that they need not be vegeta­
rians based on religious values. To 
do this he has written a review of my 
book that is filled with inaccurate and 
misleading statements and implications. 
Gruber's answer to the inhumane 
excesses of factory farming is to elim­
inate objectionable practices. Some­
how he neglects to tell us how to do 
th is. Does he ex pect those who ra ise 
animals to forget their economic inter­
ests and be more considerate of ani­
mals? 
With rega rd to health, Gruber is 
evidently u nawa re of the strong 
recent evidence Ii nki ng meat-centered 
diets to heart attacks, many types of 
cancer, and other diseases. His 
assertion that "Even if the medical 
evidence indicates that a vegetarian 
diet wou Id increase ou r longevity, it 
is unfounded that the human life span 
would increase by 800 years or more," 
completely distorts my statement (pp. 
2,3) that "Of course, a shift to a 
sensible vegetarian diet will not 
increase life spans to anywhere near 
those of early people, but r'ecent 
medical evidence indicates that it 
would lead to an increase in the aver'­
age span of life." 
Gr'uber's assertion that I do not 
define what is "natural" regarding the 
human diet conveniently overlooks the 
discussion on pages 35 and 36 and the 
table on page 37 which clearly show 
that biologically we are closest to fruit 
eating animals. He conveniently 
ignores 7 out of the 8 anatomical simi­
larities given. Also, the fact that 
peole have developed tools wh ich 
enable us to slaughter animals and 
p repa re meat to eat does not mea n 
that it is natural for" us to eat meat, 
any more than the wor"ld's cut'rent 
arsenal of 50,000 nuclear weapons 
makes the production of such arma­
ments natu ral. 
Gruber, similarly, downplays the 
effects that a switch to vegeta ria n 
diets could have in reducing the 
scandal of global hunger. He conven­
iently ignores the many statistics in 
my book which show just how wasteful 
of grain, land, water, fuel, pesti­
cides, and fertilizer meat-centered 
diets are. While Gruber is correct in 
stating that hunger is primarily 
related to the distribution of food and 
wealth, he overlooks my statement 
that, after people shifted to vegeta­
rian diets, "it would then be neces­
sary to promote policies that would 
enable people in the underdeveloped 
countries to use their resources and 
skills to become food self-reliant." 
Being aware that vegetarianism is only 
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part of the answer to global hunger, I 
address this issue in far' more detail 
in my r'ecently published book, Juda­
ism and Global Survival. The matter 
of conscience that Gruber fails to 
addr'ess is how a per'son can continue 
a diet which involves the waste of so 
much grain and the importing of beef 
fr'om poverty-str'icken countries (the 
U.S. leads the world in this t·egard) 
when millions of people die of hunger 
each year. 
Gruber similiarly downplays the 
violations of bal tashchit (the Biblical 
pt'ohibition against wastefulness) 
related to meat-centered diets. Since, 
as he states, the production of food is 
certainly a useful purpose, he is not 
bothered by the waste of valuable 
productive resou rces associated with 
livestock agriculture. Once again he 
asserts that rather than tu rning to 
vegetarianism, we should adopt less 
wasteful methods of r'aising and 
slaughtering cattle, without explaining 
how this can be done in the face of 
the hunger of corporations for the 
maximization of profits. 
Finally Gruber denies the value of 
vegetarianism in· creating a more 
peacefu I world.. In spite of over­
whelming evidence, he den ies that 
more people wou Id be able to enjoy 
the earth's resources jf everyone ate 
a vegetarian diet. He challenges the 
idea that vegetarianism helps people to 
be more peaceful, compassionate, and 
humane by bringing up the ruthless 
"vegetarian" Adolph Hitler. This is 
equivalent to condemning all members 
of a group, for example, because of 
the unethical acts of one member. 
For the record, several biographers of 
Hitler have commented on his fondness 
for several types of meat; Hitler evi­
dently was a vegetarian for several 
periods of his life to help overcome 
the negative hea Ith effects of his gen­
eray meat-based diet. 
Gruber claims that my extensive 
chapter on questions frequently asked 
of jewish vegetarians does not answer 
the ones raised in his review. But, 
he overlooks my question 15 (page 
81), which, I believe, directly 
addresses Gruber's most consistent 
argument against my book: 
Question: Instead of advo­
cating vegetarianism, shouldn't 
we try to alleviate the eyils of 
the factor'y farming system so 
that animals are treated better, 
less grain is wasted, and less 
health-harming chemical are 
used? 
Answer: The breeding of 
animals is a big business, 
whose prime concern is p,·ofit. 
Animals are raised the way 
they are today because it 
increases profits. Improving 
conditions as suggested by this 
question would certainly be 
strongly resisted by the meat 
industry and, if successful, 
would greatly increase al ready 
high pl'ices. 
Here are two counter ques­
tions. Why not abstain from 
eating meat as a protest 
against present policies while 
trying to improve them? Even 
under the best of conditions, 
why take the life of a creature 
of God, "whose tender mercies 
are over all his creatures," 
when it is not necessa ry for 
proper nutrition? 
His other questions are answered 
by the abundance of information in my 
book showing the negative effects of 
flesh -centered diets with rega I'd to 
the treatment of animals, human 
health, world hunger, pollution, 
waste, and the possibility of war. 
Rabbi Gruber is so determined to 
argue against vegetarianism that he 
ignores the great weight judaism 
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traditionally gives to Talmudic sages 
and Biblical commentators in explain­
ing and clarifying verses of the 
Torah. Hence, when he asserts that 
Genesis 1:29 may not indicate that 
people were meant to be vegetarians, 
he is disagreeing with the opinion of 
countless rabbis and scholars, who 
have analyzed the Torah in great 
detail. If this verse were not meant 
as a prohibition against eating meat, 
why _was it necessary for God to later 
give permission to Noah to use animals 
for food? 
He also distorts several of my 
statements related to the Bible. For 
example, he states that I attribute the 
reduction in life spans recorded in the 
Bible to the change of diet from vege­
tarian to meat consuming. In the 
book, I state that this is "a possible 
explanation." He also claims that I 
assert that "a carnivorous diet leads 
humans to such corrupt practices as 
eating limbs torn from living animals." 
What I do indicate is that because of 
such corrupt practices, as a conces­
sion to people's weakness, permission 
to eat meat was given to Noah (Gen. 
9:3.) Several more examples of 
incorrect assertions by Gruber· could 
be given. 
I do frequently quote great Jewish 
authorities throughout the book. This 
is to illustrate that the analysis and 
opinions are not just mine, but are 
based on Jewish tradition, as inter­
V/4�E&A  
preted by Jewish scholars. Without 
the support of these great leadet~s,
my arguments would have far less 
weight. 
I am sorry that Gruber, a long­
time vegetarian, is unhappy with my 
book. However, Judaism and Vegeta­
rianism . has been enthusiastically 
received (50 favorable reviews), espe­
cially by Jewish vegetarians. Mr. 
Philip Pick, the founder of the inter­
national "Jewish Vegetarian Society" 
wrote the foreword to the book. A 
review in the Jewish Vegetarian called 
Judaism and Vegetarianism" ... a bril­
liant book of outstanding merit ... a 
class ic that should fi nd its way into 
every Jewish bookcase and certainly 
of interest to all others who love to 
widen thei r -knowledge of the ancient 
and compassionate philosophies." 
Rabbi Gruber starts and ends his 
review by stating that I bring out the 
correct principles but fail to properly 
develop them to convince readers to 
become vegeta rians. In view of the 
many problems related to meat-cen­
tered diets, he would do a gt~eat pub­
lic service if he would drop his 
apparent anti-vegetarian bias and 
show us a better way to use Jewish 
val ues to convi nce people to adopt 
vegetarian diets. Until he does this, 
he appears to be in the position of 
one who criticizes without having any­
thing better to offer. 
Richard H. Schwartz� 
College of Staten Island� 
IN RE: E&AV/3, White's review of Norton's� 
"Environmental Ethics Anthropocentrism"�and Weak  
In his review of my "Environmental James E. White misunde-rstands the 
Ethics and Weak Anth ropocentrism, " logic of my case. .He argues that the 
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examples I include in order to illus­
trate my case at'e not really examples 
of anthropocentricaliy based ethics. 
Perhaps my examples are not unex­
ceptionable. Her'e is not the place to 
enter into detailed textual analysis. 
My case does not t~est on examples, 
but on my analysis and framework of 
defi n ition s . ­
I say that an environmental ethic 
wil be "adequate" if it provides a set 
of pt'inciples sufficiently strong to 
proscribe behaviors "wh ich vi rtually 
all environmentally sensitive individu­
als agree at'e environmentally destruc­
tive." And I a rgue that wea k anth ro­
pocentt'ism, an environmental ethic 
that distinguishes between actual felt 
pt'eferences (which may be irrational) 
and considered felt preferences 
(rationally justifiable preferences) is 
adequate in this sense. While the 
pursuit of selfish, short.,.term, con­
sumptive desi res may lead to the 
destruction of nature, a far-sighted 
individual with scientific knowledge, 
rationally defensible moral ideals, and 
a set of preferences consistent with 
such a world view would protect 
natu re fot~ human t'easons. This pro­
tection is essential for the long-term 
survival of the human species. Fur­
ther, a rational individual would see 
the value of wild species and natural 
ecosystems as occasions exami­for the 
nation and reformation of short­
sighted, selfish, and consumptive 
materialistic values. I call the value 
of such experiences "transformative." 
How badly White misconstrues my 
argument is indicated by his conclu­
sion that "[weak anthropocentrism] 
pl'esents no th reat to advocates of 
nona nth ropocentrism, .. If • No th reat 
was ever' suggested or implied-I 
showed that environmental policy mak­
ers need not choose between strong 
anth ropocentrism, the view that 
nature has value only for fulfilling the 
demands that our currently misguided 
society registers, and nonan­
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thropocentrism, which posits intrinsic 
value for nonhuman species. 
That pro-environmental policy mak­
ers might wish to avoid this choice is 
indicated by the almost complete lack 
of theoretical explanation and justi-fj­
cation of claims attributing intrinsic 
value to nonhumans (see, for examp1le, 
the disclaimers listed by Tom Regan in 
the "The Nature and Possibility of an 
Environmental Ethic," Environmental 
Ethics 3 (1981), pp. 19-34). The 
bu rden of my case was to show that a 
form of anth ropocentrism wh ich places 
appropriate weight on human ideals 
embedded consistently within a ration­
ally defensible world view would 
include principles adequate to protect 
wild species and natural ecosystems. 
I intentionally left open the question 
of whether nonhuman species or spec­
imens have intrinsic value. I do not 
see how such claims can be evaluated 
until nonanthropocentrists give a much 
clearer explanation of what character­
istics indicate and justify such value. 
Quite aside from the truth of such 
abstract claims, policy makers can 
justifiably ask whether philosophers 
can justify environmental protection on 
some other basis. Must the develop­
ment of an adequate environmental 
pol icy wait unti I ph ilosophers resolve 
their internecine quarrels about 
whether humans are "superior" to 
plants and animals and so forth? 
(See, for example, Paul Taylor, "Are 
Humans Superior to Animals and 
Plants?" Environmental Ethics 6 
(1984), pp. 149-160.) Given the lack 
of specificity of, and absence of any 
con sens us on, claims of intri nsic val ue 
such as Regan's and Taylor's, policy 
makers might well fear that humans 
will live in an otherwise sterile world 
before philosophers agree on a con­
cept of intrinsic value sufficiently 
justified and precise to determine the 
details of environmental policy. 
The pu rpose of my paper was to 
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show that proscriptions against envi­
ronmental destruction and the genera­
tion of a positive envi ronmental policy 
need not wait upon these philosophical 
developments. If this argument is 
considered a "threat" by nonanthropo­
centrists, this may result more from 
their embarassment at being unable to 
describe adequate principles for envi­
ronmental protection deriving from 
their ethical and metaphysical views, 
than from my case that environmental 
policy formation can proceed on 
V/4�E&A  
another, equally adequate basis. 
(See, for example, Peter Singer's 
problems in det~iving fl~om his nonan­
thropocentric principles ·any special 
obligation to give special treatment to 
individual members of nearly extinct 
species. "Not for Humans Only: The 
Place of Nonhumans in Environmental 
Issues," in K. Goodpaster and K. 
Sayr~e, Ethics and the Problems of the 
21st Century (South Bend, Ind.: 
Notre Dame University Press, 1979), 
p. 203.) 
Brya n G. Norton� 
New College of the University of South Florida� 
IN RE: This Issue, White's review of Loftin's� 
Hunting"�"The Morality of  
I agree that hunters are not the 
only group working to preserve habi­
tat for wildlife. There are many oth­
ers, but to subtract hunters (and 
fishermen?) from the total social effort 
would have a serious weakening 
effect'. In Florida, where I live, I 
have often seen hunters, fishermen, 
bird watchers, hikers, campers, and 
others work together for en vi ronmen­
tal causes such as stopping the Cross 
Florida Barge Canal or setting aside 
the priceless Guana tract. Without 
the hunters I don't think we could 
have prevailed as often as we have. 
I don't know what a happy life is 
for a White-tailed Deer or a Bobwhite 
Quail. If a happy life means not to 
be hunted, no quail will know that 
until Red Foxes and Cooper's Hawks 
become extinct. The reviewer seems 
to rega rd a "happy life" and a "nor­
mal life" for a game animal as the 
same. A normal life for a game animal 
is to be hunted, and, more often than 
not, to die in violence and pain. If I 
had my way, the lives of many more 
White-tailed Deer in Florida would end 
under the fangs of a Flol'ida Panther. 
I would like to see the r~e-establish­
ment of the natural predators to con­
trol overpopulation among game ani­
mals. That is the normal life.' 
Whether it is a "happy" life I cannot 
say, but, to quote Aida Leopold, "it 
is a poor life that achieves freedom 
from fear." 
I suppose that by a "happy life" 
the reviewer has in mind something 
like the lot of the tame ducks that 
loiter around 
grace many 
These animals 
hang a rou nd 
because the 
them bread. 
the artificial ponds that 
apartment complexes. 
are not confined, they 
of thei r own accord and 
apartment dwellers feed 
They are not hunted by 
human or natural predators, and they 
don't have to work to make a living so 
I guess they must lead "happy lives." 
All they have to do is eat and bt~eed,
so after a few generations of misce­
genation they are an odd lot indeed. 
Since natu ral selection is not operat­
ing to hone their generic heritage to 
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the razor sharpness necessary for 
survival in the wild, all sorts of gen­
eric oddities are seen in these motley 
assemblases. Apparently this is the 
sort of life that some animals libera­
tionists would like to see all animals 
lead (see If Predation" by Steve 
Sapontzis, Ethics & Animals 5: 27) . 
Personally, I r-egard these poor crea­
tures as objects of pity mingled with 
disgust. 
I'm not sure about the feasibility of 
a sterilization program to control 
over'population of game animals. Pre­
sumably this would involve capturing 
lar-ge numbers of male animals for 
vasectomies or someth i ng of the sor't. 
Such an effort wou Id be enormously 
time consuming and expensive, so at 
the present time, I don't think this 
solution is technically feasible. But 
the interesting philosophical question 
is-Suppose it were? Lefs imagine a 
sterilization drug which worked only 
on White-tailed Deer which could be 
distributed at low cost simply by 
scattering it at salt licks or" broad­
casting it from aircra.ft. Would a good 
utilitarian prefer this to contr"olling 
overpopulation by hunting? It seems 
obvious to me that the answer is yes. 
My personal preference would 'be to 
foster natural predators, but cheap, 
feasible sterilization would be prefera­
ble to hunting to contro'ltro,1 excess popu­
lation in those animals that will over­
populate and stress the habitat. 
The final point the reviewer makes 
is that in his honest opinion, the bad 
consequences of spo ...t hunting out­
weigh the good consequences. This 
points up what has long been realized 
about utilitarianism or any consequen­
tialist position-just how does one 
weigh the consequences? Hunters 
shoot other hunters (and non-hunt­
ers) each year just as swimmers are 
drowned each year. Are the. lives 
lost swimming enough to prohibit these 
activities? I don't know of any i ntel­
ligent way to answer that question, 
which is only to point up the major 
weakness of consequentialist ethical 
thinking. 
Robert W. Loftin� 
University of North Florida� 
IN RE: This Issue, Sapontzis's Callicott's�review of  
"Animal Liberation: A Affair"�Triangular  
wrote "Animal Liberation: A Tri­
angular Affair" ina bold, swashbuck­
ling style precisely in order to attract 
the kind of cdtical notice which Steve 
F. Sapontzis has given it here. My 
prima ry pu rpose was to d raw a sha rp 
distinction between envi ronmental and 
animal welfare ethics, which, before 
"A Triangular Affair" appeared, had 
been generally (and carelessly) con­
fused. A seconda ry pu rpose was to 
draw animal welfare ethicists (a much 
larger contingent of professional 
philosophers because animal welfare 
ethics rest upon much more timid, 
conventional precepts) into debate 
with environmental ethicists (a much 
smaller contingent of professional phi­
losophers because environmental ethics 
require much more creative ethical 
theory building). At the time it was 
written a cozy, essentially internecine 
controversy was bubbling along 
between conservative humanitarian 
ethicists ("moral humanists" as 
called them there) like R. G. Frey 
I 
I 
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and liberal animal liberationists 
("humane moralists") like Tom Regan. 
Environmental ethics as such was sim­
ply la rgely ignored. 
As a philosophical pt'ovocateur, I 
have been, if anything, too success­
ful. Before Sapontzis, Edward John­
son, William Aiken, Robin Attfield, 
Mary Ann Warren, and, in a veiled 
sort of way (I suspect so as not to 
make it ,more widely known than it 
already was), Tom Regan have all 
publicly been horrified and outraged 
by irA Triangular Affciirlr-p,articulat'ly 
by its radical ethical holism. 1 Now 
that I have managed to draw attention 
to the really new and different 
approach to an expanded moral sensi­
bility sketched in the land ethic of 
Aldo Leopold, I hope soon to detail a 
more finely textured interpretation 
and elaboration of it wh ich eschews 
the Irtotal holism" (in Sapontzis' 
terms) of my original characterization 
or rather caricature. After all, "a 
land ethic," according to Aldo Leo­
pold, "implies respect for ... fellow 
members [of the biotic community] and 
also [i. e., as well as] respect for the 
community as such. "2 I chose not to 
emphasize the former, respect for fel­
low members, in PIA Triangular 
Affair," so that I might more starkly 
highlight the latter, respect for the 
community as such-and thus contrast 
niore vividly environmental ethics and 
animal welfare ethics. The land ethic, 
as I think I can show, actually pro­
vides a comprehensive moral theory 
which will consistently accommodate 
(1) humanitarian moral concerns (the 
dignity of human individuals and pri­
macy of human interests), (2) respect 
for non-human individual animals (and 
plants as well), and (3) the more hol­
istic (and distinctly environmental) 
concern for populations, species, 
biotic communities, and the global 
ecosystem. 3 
According to Sapontzis, "Animal 
Liberation: A Triangular Affair" has 
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become the '''classic' en vi ronmental 
ethics critique of the animal t'ights 
movement. Ir If so (and at the risk of 
appearing immodest I will not gainsay 
it), it can't be as bad a piece of phi­
losophy as he ma kes it out to be. 
The space allowed me het'e does not 
permit a reply to each of the issues 
Sapontzi s raises in interp I'eti ng and 
criticizing it. I, therefore, invite 
readers of this journal whose interest 
has been piqued to read Ir A Tt'iangu'­
lar Affair" with an open mind and 
evaluate for themselves its conceptual 
architettu re and arguments. 
In"A Triangula r Affai r" I tried 
strictly to maintain a journalistic sep­
a ration between myself, as reporter 
and commentator and the two philo­
sophical movements-envi ronmental and 
animal welfare ethics-"-I was comparing 
and contrasti ng. My sympath ies for 
Aldo Leopold's land ethic and against 
animal welfare ethics were, however, 
unconcealed. Even so, it cannot be 
accu rately or fa irly said that I per­
sonally develop there an environmental 
ethic or for that matter, that I per:­
sonally advocate a philosophy of any 
sort as Sapontzis' remarks frequently 
imply. 
Nowhere, I think, does he distot't 
my discussion more than when he says 
that I seem to regret that it is impos­
sible to return to the Stone Age and 
that I favor, among other less noisome 
things, infanticide, stylized warfare, 
leaving injured wilderness adventurers 
to their fate, and sexual continency. 
As the page numbers he cites wi II 
reveal, mention of these th ingswas 
scattered and occurred in very differ­
ent contexts. I remark that human 
ecologist Garrett Hardin (not I) has 
publicly recommended a non - ,.'escue 
policy for wilderness excursions and, 
not that we ought, but that tribal 
people-whose moral views, neverthe­
less, might provide val uableperspec­
tive on our own~did optimize their 
populations by (God forbid) sexual 
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conti nency, abortion, infa nticide, and 
stylized war'fa,.'e. I will here confess 
that I do in fact favor and indeed 
practice a personal regime which 
includes a simple (incidentally, vege­
tarian) diet and vigorous exercise, 
and, speaking just for myself, nor 
wishing to impose such a bizarre doc­
t I' ineon any0 neeIs e , I do in fa ct 
rega rd ch I'on ic ill ness as a wor'se evi I 
than death. But in"A Triangu la r 
Affai r" these attitudes and practices 
were variously attributed to other 
thinkers or other peoples' mores, as 
the case may be; they were not 
expressly advocated by me. 
I don't mind being accused of hav­
ing done bad philosophy. The histol'y 
of philosophy is a history of philo­
sophical er'l'or-otherwise it would al 
have come to an end in the one true 
view. The important thing is to go 
wrong in interesting 'and provocative 
way s . (J udgin 9 . by the s t ro ng 
response so far to "A Triangular 
Affair," it went wrong in very crea­
tive ways. ) However, I wou Id be 
very mOl'tified to have done bad 
scholarship-for which I can discover 
no similar ,'edeeming virtue. Hence, I 
will defend myself directly and specif­
ically against Sapontzis' claim that I 
have not gotten my Plato right. 
To prove that Plato is not a moral 
holist-the philosophical antecedent at 
the level of social ethics which both 
Kenneth Goodpaster and I suggest as 
a respectable paradigm for a holistic 
environmental ethic-Sapontzis refers 
us to the origins of society as specu­
1ativey posited by Plato early in the 
Republic. 4 Sapontzis infers that, 
since Plato imagines a human commu­
nity to arise because each person does 
not suffice for his or her own needs 
and so associates with others, there­
fore (7) Plato regards the common­
wealth to exist for the happiness of 
its individual constituents severally. 
But we need not deduce Plato's 
views on this point since he later 
makes them quite exp,'ess. At the 
beginning of Republic IV Adeimantus 
complains to Socrates that he (Socra­
tes) is "not making these men very 
happy." To which Socrates replies 
that "the object on which we fixed our 
eyes in the establishment of the state 
was ... the greatest happiness of the 
city as a whole. "5 And if that does 
not prove that Plato espoused moral 
holism, still later, in Republic VII, 
Socrates refers back to this point and 
reiterates it in even stronger terms, 
if that is possible. He says, "You 
have forgotten, my friend [Glaucon, 
this time], that the law is concerned 
not with the special happiness of any 
class in the state, but is trying to 
pl'oduce this condition' in the whole, 
harmonizing and adapting the citizens 
to one another by persuasion and 
compulsion . .. , not that it may allow 
each to take what course pleases him, 
but with a view to using them [!] for 
the binding together of the common­
wealth."6 
Sapontzis doesn't attempt to deal 
with the other (overwhelming) evi­
dence I cite in "A Triangular Affair" 
for Plato's "total" (social) holism at 
least in the Republic. So on this 
question of how' to read Plato-as a 
moral atomist or a moral holist-I must 
insist that I am right to think that he 
is a holist and Sapontzis is wrong to 
think that he is not. 
This seemingly trivial scholarly 
dispute opens onto a larger, much 
more important question , perhaps 
really the deepest bone of contention 
between Sapontzis and myself, viz., 
what is moral philosophy and what 
ought its business to be? Sapontzis 
seems to think that moral philosophy 
should first construct a rationale for 
"currently accepted moral principles 
or values"-he cites Kant as an exemp­
lar of this approach-and then per­
haps-this is apparently the only moral 
criticism he thin ks legitimate-poi nt out 
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that common practice is hypocritical, 
that, in other words, common practice 
does not in all domains exemplify the 
moral principles or values to which 
most people publicly swear allegiance. 
In this, Sapontzis affords, I think, a 
very illuminating analysis of the gen­
er'al program of animal welfare ethics. 
Our current culture values equality, 
justice, compassion, and the allevia­
tion of suffering. Peter Singer found 
a simple rationale for these values in 
classical ethical hedonism. He then 
poi nted out that most people tu rn a 
blind eye to the extreme hardship and 
suffering imposed upon innocent, 
equally sentient animals. This is a 
valuable service, which I respect, but 
I do not th in k it is the whole or the 
only legitimate role of moral philoso­
phy. Sapontizis, on the other hand, 
wants somehow to prove that this is 
the only legitimate thing a moral phi­
losopher can do. Anything signifi­
cantly deviating from "currently 
accepted moral principles or values" 
would be "merely 'a code for conduct­
i ng on e' s Iife' [ not] a mo I'aIity at aII , " 
he claims. 
If constructing a rationale for cur­
rently accepted moral principles or 
values and criticizing only moral prac­
tice is all that moral philosophers may 
properly do, one wonders whose job it 
is to criticize currently accepted moral 
principles or values themselves? Or 
does Sapontzis want to rule them 
beyond criticism? Are they an impla­
cable given? 
Surely there is some merit, from 
time to time, in taking an intellectu­
ally disciplined critical look at cur­
rently accepted moral principles or 
values themselves and speculatively 
advancing alternatives. If no one 
did, or as Sapontzis seems to wish, 
no one were allowed to, there would 
be no change at all or only an aimless 
drift in commonly accepted moral prin­
ciples or values. Plato's moral and 
political philosophy is the historical 
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exemplar not only of my kind of moral 
holism but of my kind of critical, 
speculative moral philosophy-if Kant's 
is the exemplar of the kind Sapontzis 
would impose. Plato lived in demo­
cratic Athens and was unalter'ably 
opposed to democracy. He was con­
sistenty critical of practically all of 
the other CLI rrently accepted moral 
values of his fellow Athenians: Think 
of the devastating par'ody of common 
Greek religious values in the 
Euthyphro and the then completely 
novel alternative at which it points; 
or the critique of curr'ent Athenian 
political values and principles of jus­
tice-giving each his due; helping 
friends and harming enemies and so 
on-i n Republic I, not to mention the 
extremely eccentric conception of an 
"ideal" community· which follows in 
subsequent books of that dialogue. 
But were it not for Plato's wholly 
novel and discontinuous moral vision 
and that of other speculative moral 
ph i losophers, we wou Id not now enjoy 
the advanced moral sensibilities 
Sapontzis so cherishes. 
More generally, Sapontzis ' concep­
tion of moral philosophy seems to me 
·to be parochial, myopic, and intellec­
tually stultifying. Other contempo­
ra r'y cu Itu res accept very differ'ent 
moral principles and values. Mention 
of Plato and the ancients reminds us 
that very different moral principles 
and values prevailed in our own West­
ern cu Itu ra I past. Stone Age peoples 
(to whom weare much closer than the 
"tens [sic] of thousands of yeal's. of 
evolution and history" Sapontzis imag­
ines separates us from them) held 
very different moral principles and 
values than those common in civilized 
cu Itu res today. I th ink that we can 
gain a very valuable pel'spective on 
- today's currently accepted mOI'al pr'in­
ciples and values by seeing them in 
this larger historical and cultural con­
text. 
Finally, a word on why think 
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animal liberation is world-denying and 
life-loathing. I have recently come to 
think that animal welfare ethics are 
appropriate for ou r relations with 
domestic animals, although as I 
pointed out in "A Triangular Affair," 
if animal liberation prevails and we all 
become vegetarians, the only domestic 
animals left in any quantity would be 
pets. We would have destroyed farm 
animals in ordet~ to have saved them. 
If, however, we extend the princi­
ples of animal liberation and animal 
,'ights into the wild with ruthless con­
sistency, we shall find ourselves 
engaged in a campaign of humane 
predator· extermination. It is ironic 
that Steve F. Sapontzis is the per·son 
who has most confirmed my darkest 
suspicions on this head. I n an al~ticle
in this jour~nal Sapontzis seriously 
entertains the possibility of policing 
the wild to prevent vicious carnivo­
rous animals from inflicting suffering 
and death on innocent herbivorous 
animals. 7 Sapontzis doesn't .think that 
t'idding the world of predators would 
not be a desirable goal or that the 
world would be immeasurably impover­
ished without predators. Rather, he 
invokes the Kantian principle that 
ought implies can and since we cannot 
succeed in eliminating predators from 
nature it is not our duty to try.8 
This is a frighteningly fragile the­
oretical barrier to an ecological night­
mare. It overlooks the practical role 
of unattainable eth ical ideals. We 
cannot do lots of things we think we 
ought to do-love ou r neighbor as ou r-
selves, always act as if the maxim of 
our action were to become a universal 
law of nature, stamp out war, pov­
erty, crime. Still we think we should 
try because in trying we may make 
some progress toward the ideal. 
Similarly, we may not be able 
humanely to phase out of nature all 
wild predators, still we should try 
and in tryng we would definitely make 
some progress toward that "ideal"-a 
natural world that much freer of pain 
and violent death, a "better" world in 
Sapontzi s' view. We cou Id all too eas­
ily succeed completely with the larger, 
rat~er predators, the Bengal Tiger, 
the other big cats, wolves, and so 
on. 
T hi sis what I mean by Iife-I oath ­
ing and world-denying. Animal liber­
ation projected to its logical conclusion 
morally condemns the most fundamental 
biological facts of life on the planet. 
Perhaps, as Sapontzis maintains, mor~­
ality requires that we oppose some 
natural tendencies and processes, but 
can it requi re us to oppose the most 
fundamental biological facts of life and 
not seem self-contradictory or at the 
very least absu rd? 
But, asl tried to point out in "A 
Triangular Affair," and on this I 
th ink Sapontzis wou Id ag ree, an imal 
liberation is the logical extension of 
current moral principles and values. 
Such internal contradictions and/or 
abs u rd ities, therefore, ca II into seri­
0us question either current moral 
principles and values and/or their 
conventional philosophical justification. 
Thus, like it or not, Sapontzis and 
other animal welfare ethicists are 
unwitting contributors to the critical 
and speculative sort of· moral philoso­
phy which I attempted in "A Triangu­
lar Affair" and which he would like to 
sweep under the rug. 
J. Baird Callicott 
University of Wisconsin, Stevens Point 
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